@inproceedings{11165,
  abstract     = {{The reduction of CO2 emissions caused by auto-mobile traffic relies on the development of electric mobility infrastructure which in turn relies on efficient communication between charge points, used to connect electric vehicles to the power network, and central systems, used to manage users and transactions. The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) is an open communication protocol designed to connect charge points to a central system. An important aspect of the communication between these entities is the security of the connection. It is conceivable, for instance, that an adversary could compromise a central system to attack charge points.This work devises three different attack scenarios which could be executed by a malicious OCPP central system to attack an OCPP charge point. It also assesses the feasibility and potential consequences of such attacks. Additionally, it presents an approach of an "evil" OCPP server implementation, based on the SteVe server which was originally developed at the RWTH Aachen. The "evil" OCPP server implements various attack scenarios and is intended to be used for penetration testing of OCPP charge points that connect to the central system via WebSockets/JSON or SOAP/XML.}},
  author       = {{Gebauer, Lisa Helene and Trsek, Henning and Lukas, Georg}},
  booktitle    = {{2022 IEEE 27th International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA)}},
  isbn         = {{9781665499965}},
  location     = {{Stuttgart}},
  publisher    = {{IEEE}},
  title        = {{{Evil SteVe: An Approach to Simplify Penetration Testing of OCPP Charge Points}}},
  doi          = {{10.1109/ETFA52439.2022.9921430}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}

@misc{12793,
  abstract     = {{Securing factory communication to protect corporate data is an important concern in the context of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). Various cryptographic protocols can be used to establish secure communication channels. One of these protocols is the Transport Layer Security 1.3 (TLS 1.3) protocol. A key component of the TLS handshake protocol is the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (ECDHKE), a public key cryptosystem used to exchange keys over insecure channels which can be based on a number of standardized elliptic curves. A special form of elliptic curves are Montgomery curves which are advantageous compared to more traditional Weierstrass curves due to their fast arithmetic. This is especially important when the ECDHKE is performed on embedded devices and in time-critical situations. In this work, the performance of ECDHKE implementations using standardized Montgomery curves Curve25519 and Curve448 included in the wolfSSL library are evaluated on an embedded 32-bit STM32L476RG Nucleo development board designed by STMicroelectronics. The benchmark results show that using Curve25519 with around 220ms for the key pair generation and the key agreement respectively is approximately 75% faster than using Curve448 with around 900ms for each of the algorithms, which can be attributed to their differing security levels. These results suggest that the algorithms might not be fast enough for time critical situations.}},
  author       = {{Gebauer, Lisa Helene and Trsek, Henning and Heiss, Stefan}},
  booktitle    = {{2022 IEEE 18th International Conference on Factory Communication Systems (WFCS)}},
  isbn         = {{978-1-6654-1087-8}},
  keywords     = {{secure, factory communication, elliptic curves, ECDHKE, performance, embedded}},
  location     = {{Pavia, ITALY}},
  pages        = {{207--210}},
  publisher    = {{IEEE}},
  title        = {{{Secure Communication in Factories - Benchmarking Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Implementations on an Embedded System}}},
  doi          = {{10.1109/wfcs53837.2022.9779189}},
  year         = {{2022}},
}